Fix an error handling path that would never have been reached. fixes ticket:2543

[tahoe-lafs/tahoe-lafs.git] / docs / backdoors.rst

diff --git a/docs/backdoors.rst b/docs/backdoors.rst
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@@ -1,39 +1,47 @@
-======================
+.. -*- coding: utf-8-with-signature -*-
+
 Statement on Backdoors
 ======================
 
 October 5, 2010
 
-The New York Times has recently reported that the current U.S. administration
-is proposing a bill that would apparently, if passed, require communication
-systems to facilitate government wiretapping and access to encrypted data:
+The New York Times has `recently reported`_ that the current
+U.S. administration is proposing a bill that would apparently, if passed,
+require communication systems to facilitate government wiretapping and access
+to encrypted data.
+
+(login required; username/password pairs available at `bugmenot`_).
+
+.. _recently reported: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html
+.. _bugmenot: http://www.bugmenot.com/view/nytimes.com
 
-`<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html>`_ (login required; username/password pairs
-available at `bugmenot <http://www.bugmenot.com/view/nytimes.com>`_).
+Commentary by the `Electronic Frontier Foundation`_, `Peter Suderman /
+Reason`_, `Julian Sanchez / Cato Institute`_.
 
-Commentary by the
-`Electronic Frontier Foundation <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/government-seeks>`_,
-`Peter Suderman / Reason <http://reason.com/blog/2010/09/27/obama-administration-frustrate>`_,
-`Julian Sanchez / Cato Institute <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/designing-an-insecure-internet/>`_.
+.. _Electronic Frontier Foundation: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/government-seeks
+.. _Peter Suderman / Reason: http://reason.com/blog/2010/09/27/obama-administration-frustrate
+.. _Julian Sanchez / Cato Institute: http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/designing-an-insecure-internet/
 
 The core Tahoe developers promise never to change Tahoe-LAFS to facilitate
 government access to data stored or transmitted by it. Even if it were
-desirable to facilitate such access—which it is not—we believe it would not be
-technically feasible to do so without severely compromising Tahoe-LAFS'
-security against other attackers. There have been many examples in which
-backdoors intended for use by government have introduced vulnerabilities
-exploitable by other parties (a notable example being the Greek cellphone
-eavesdropping scandal in 2004/5). RFCs `1984 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1984>`_
-and `2804 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804>`_ elaborate on the security case
-against such backdoors.
-
-Note that since Tahoe-LAFS is open-source software, forks by people other than
-the current core developers are possible. In that event, we would try to
+desirable to facilitate such access -- which it is not -- we believe it would
+not be technically feasible to do so without severely compromising
+Tahoe-LAFS' security against other attackers. There have been many examples
+in which backdoors intended for use by government have introduced
+vulnerabilities exploitable by other parties (a notable example being the
+Greek cellphone eavesdropping scandal in 2004/5). RFCs `1984`_ and `2804`_
+elaborate on the security case against such backdoors.
+
+.. _1984: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1984
+.. _2804: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804
+
+Note that since Tahoe-LAFS is open-source software, forks by people other
+than the current core developers are possible. In that event, we would try to
 persuade any such forks to adopt a similar policy.
 
 The following Tahoe-LAFS developers agree with this statement:
 
-David-Sarah Hopwood
+David-Sarah Hopwood [Daira Hopwood]
 
 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn