From: Zooko O'Whielacronx Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 23:37:25 +0000 (-0700) Subject: docs: reformat for 70 columns plus a few small edits X-Git-Tag: allmydata-tahoe-1.1.0~19 X-Git-Url: https://git.rkrishnan.org/components/com_hotproperty/frontends/%3C?a=commitdiff_plain;h=56d6c5798f58b69c706957145339b1b7b39f29a2;p=tahoe-lafs%2Ftahoe-lafs.git docs: reformat for 70 columns plus a few small edits --- diff --git a/docs/known_issues.txt b/docs/known_issues.txt index 8d7770f9..948f8831 100644 --- a/docs/known_issues.txt +++ b/docs/known_issues.txt @@ -1,79 +1,83 @@ = Known Issues = -Below is a list of known issues in recent releases of Tahoe, and how to manage -them. +Below is a list of known issues in recent releases of Tahoe, and how +to manage them. == issues in Tahoe v1.1.0, released 2008-06-10 == === issue 1: server out of space when writing mutable file === -If a v1.0 or v1.1.0 storage server runs out of disk space then its attempts to -write data to the local filesystem will fail. For immutable files, this will -not lead to any problem (the attempt to upload that share to that server will -fail, the partially uploaded share will be deleted from the storage server's -"incoming shares" directory, and the client will move on to using another -storage server instead). - -If the write was an attempt to modify an existing mutable file, however, a -problem will result: when the attempt to write the new share fails due to -insufficient disk space, then it will be aborted and the old share will be left -in place. If enough such old shares are left, then a subsequent read may get -those old shares and see the file in its earlier state, which is a "rollback" -failure. With the default parameters (3-of-10), six old shares will be enough -to potentially lead to a rollback failure. +If a v1.0 or v1.1.0 storage server runs out of disk space then its +attempts to write data to the local filesystem will fail. For +immutable files, this will not lead to any problem (the attempt to +upload that share to that server will fail, the partially uploaded +share will be deleted from the storage server's "incoming shares" +directory, and the client will move on to using another storage server +instead). + +If the write was an attempt to modify an existing mutable file, +however, a problem will result: when the attempt to write the new +share fails due to insufficient disk space, then it will be aborted +and the old share will be left in place. If enough such old shares +are left, then a subsequent read may get those old shares and see the +file in its earlier state, which is a "rollback" failure. With the +default parameters (3-of-10), six old shares will be enough to +potentially lead to a rollback failure. ==== how to manage it ==== -Make sure your Tahoe storage servers don't run out of disk space. This means -refusing storage requests before the disk fills up. There are a couple of ways -to do that with v1.1. - -First, there is a configuration option named "sizelimit" which will cause the -storage server to do a "du" style recursive examination of its directories at -startup, and then if the sum of the size of files found therein is greater than -the "sizelimit" number, it will reject requests by clients to write new -immutable shares. - -However, that can take a long time (something on the order of a minute of -examination of the filesystem for each 10 GB of data stored in the Tahoe -server), and the Tahoe server will be unavailable to clients during that time. - -Another option is to set the "readonly_storage" configuration option on the -storage server before startup. This will cause the storage server to reject -all requests to upload new immutable shares. - -Note that neither of these configurations affect mutable shares: even if -sizelimit is configured and the storage server currently has greater space used -than allowed, or even if readonly_storage is configured, servers will continue -to accept new mutable shares and will continue to accept requests to overwrite -existing mutable shares. - -Mutable files are typically used only for directories, and are usually much -smaller than immutable files, so if you use one of these configurations to stop -the influx of immutable files while there is still sufficient disk space to -receive an influx of (much smaller) mutable files, you may be able to avoid the -potential for "rollback" failure. +Make sure your Tahoe storage servers don't run out of disk space. +This means refusing storage requests before the disk fills up. There +are a couple of ways to do that with v1.1. + +First, there is a configuration option named "sizelimit" which will +cause the storage server to do a "du" style recursive examination of +its directories at startup, and then if the sum of the size of files +found therein is greater than the "sizelimit" number, it will reject +requests by clients to write new immutable shares. + +However, that can take a long time (something on the order of a minute +of examination of the filesystem for each 10 GB of data stored in the +Tahoe server), and the Tahoe server will be unavailable to clients +during that time. + +Another option is to set the "readonly_storage" configuration option +on the storage server before startup. This will cause the storage +server to reject all requests to upload new immutable shares. + +Note that neither of these configurations affect mutable shares: even +if sizelimit is configured and the storage server currently has +greater space used than allowed, or even if readonly_storage is +configured, servers will continue to accept new mutable shares and +will continue to accept requests to overwrite existing mutable shares. + +Mutable files are typically used only for directories, and are usually +much smaller than immutable files, so if you use one of these +configurations to stop the influx of immutable files while there is +still sufficient disk space to receive an influx of (much smaller) +mutable files, you may be able to avoid the potential for "rollback" +failure. A future version of Tahoe will include a fix for this issue. Here is -[http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2008-May/000630.html the mailing list -discussion] about how that future version will work. +[http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2008-May/000630.html the +mailing list discussion] about how that future version will work. == issues in Tahoe v1.1.0 and v1.0.0 == -=== issue 2: pyOpenSSL and/or Twisted defect resulting false alarms in the unit tests === +=== issue 2: pyOpenSSL/Twisted defect causes false alarms in tests === -The combination of Twisted v8 and pyOpenSSL v0.7 causes the Tahoe v1.1 unit -tests to fail, even though the behavior of Tahoe itself which is being tested is -correct. +The combination of Twisted v8 and pyOpenSSL v0.7 causes the Tahoe v1.1 +unit tests to fail, even though the behavior of Tahoe itself which is +being tested is correct. ==== how to manage it ==== -If you are using Twisted v8 and pyOpenSSL v0.7, then please ignore the ERROR -"Reactor was unclean" in test_system and test_introducer. Downgrading to an -older version of Twisted or pyOpenSSL will cause those false alarms to stop -happening. +If you are using Twisted v8 and pyOpenSSL v0.7, then please ignore +ERROR "Reactor was unclean" in test_system and test_introducer. +Downgrading to an older version of Twisted or pyOpenSSL will cause +those false alarms to stop happening. == issues in Tahoe v1.0.0, released 2008-03-25 == @@ -82,73 +86,79 @@ happening. === issue 3: server out of space when writing mutable file === -In addition to the problems caused by insufficient disk space described above, -v1.0 clients which are writing mutable files when the servers fail to write to -their filesystem are likely to think the write succeeded, when it in fact -failed. This can cause data loss. +In addition to the problems caused by insufficient disk space +described above, v1.0 clients which are writing mutable files when the +servers fail to write to their filesystem are likely to think the +write succeeded, when it in fact failed. This can cause data loss. ==== how to manage it ==== -Upgrade client to v1.1, or make sure that servers are always able to write to -their local filesystem (including that there is space available) as described in -"issue 1" above. +Upgrade client to v1.1, or make sure that servers are always able to +write to their local filesystem (including that there is space +available) as described in "issue 1" above. === issue 4: server out of space when writing immutable file === -Tahoe v1.0 clients are using v1.0 servers which are unable to write to their -filesystem during an immutable upload will correctly detect the first failure, -but if they retry the upload without restarting the client, or if another client -attempts to upload the same file, the second upload may appear to succeed when -it hasn't, which can lead to data loss. +Tahoe v1.0 clients are using v1.0 servers which are unable to write to +their filesystem during an immutable upload will correctly detect the +first failure, but if they retry the upload without restarting the +client, or if another client attempts to upload the same file, the +second upload may appear to succeed when it hasn't, which can lead to +data loss. ==== how to manage it ==== -Upgrading either or both of the client and the server to v1.1 will fix this -issue. Also it can be avoided by ensuring that the servers are always able to -write to their local filesystem (including that there is space available) as -described in "issue 1" above. +Upgrading either or both of the client and the server to v1.1 will fix +this issue. Also it can be avoided by ensuring that the servers are +always able to write to their local filesystem (including that there +is space available) as described in "issue 1" above. -=== issue 5: large directories or mutable files in a specific range of sizes === +=== issue 5: large directories or mutable files of certain sizes === -If a client attempts to upload a large mutable file with a size greater than -about 3,139,000 and less than or equal to 3,500,000 bytes then it will fail but -appear to succeed, which can lead to data loss. +If a client attempts to upload a large mutable file with a size +greater than about 3,139,000 and less than or equal to 3,500,000 bytes +then it will fail but appear to succeed, which can lead to data loss. -(Mutable files larger than 3,500,000 are refused outright). The symptom of the -failure is very high memory usage (3 GB of memory) and 100% CPU for about 5 -minutes, before it appears to succeed, although it hasn't. +(Mutable files larger than 3,500,000 are refused outright). The +symptom of the failure is very high memory usage (3 GB of memory) and +100% CPU for about 5 minutes, before it appears to succeed, although +it hasn't. -Directories are stored in mutable files, and a directory of approximately 9000 -entries may fall into this range of mutable file sizes (depending on the size of -the filenames or other metadata associated with the entries). +Directories are stored in mutable files, and a directory of +approximately 9000 entries may fall into this range of mutable file +sizes (depending on the size of the filenames or other metadata +associated with the entries). ==== how to manage it ==== -This was fixed in v1.1, under ticket #379. If the client is upgraded to v1.1, -then it will fail cleanly instead of falsely appearing to succeed when it tries -to write a file whose size is in this range. If the server is also upgraded to -v1.1, then writes of mutable files whose size is in this range will succeed. -(If the server is upgraded to v1.1 but the client is still v1.0 then the client -will still suffer this failure.) +This was fixed in v1.1, under ticket #379. If the client is upgraded +to v1.1, then it will fail cleanly instead of falsely appearing to +succeed when it tries to write a file whose size is in this range. If +the server is also upgraded to v1.1, then writes of mutable files +whose size is in this range will succeed. (If the server is upgraded +to v1.1 but the client is still v1.0 then the client will still suffer +this failure.) === issue 6: pycryptopp defect resulting in data corruption === -Versions of pycryptopp earlier than pycryptopp-0.5.0 had a defect which, when -compiled with some compilers, would cause AES-256 encryption and decryption to -be computed incorrectly. This could cause data corruption. Tahoe v1.0 -required, and came with a bundled copy of, pycryptopp v0.3. +Versions of pycryptopp earlier than pycryptopp-0.5.0 had a defect +which, when compiled with some compilers, would cause AES-256 +encryption and decryption to be computed incorrectly. This could +cause data corruption. Tahoe v1.0 required, and came with a bundled +copy of, pycryptopp v0.3. ==== how to manage it ==== -You can detect whether pycryptopp-0.3 has this failure when it is compiled by -your compiler. Run the unit tests that come with pycryptopp-0.3: unpack the -"pycryptopp-0.3.tar" file that comes in the Tahoe v1.0 {{{misc/dependencies}}} -directory, cd into the resulting {{{pycryptopp-0.3.0}}} directory, and execute -{{{python ./setup.py test}}}. If the tests pass, then your compiler does not -trigger this failure. +You can detect whether pycryptopp-0.3 has this failure when it is +compiled by your compiler. Run the unit tests that come with +pycryptopp-0.3: unpack the "pycryptopp-0.3.tar" file that comes in the +Tahoe v1.0 {{{misc/dependencies}}} directory, cd into the resulting +{{{pycryptopp-0.3.0}}} directory, and execute {{{python ./setup.py +test}}}. If the tests pass, then your compiler does not trigger this +failure. -Tahoe v1.1 requires, and comes with a bundled copy of, pycryptopp v0.5.1, which -does not have this defect. +Tahoe v1.1 requires, and comes with a bundled copy of, pycryptopp +v0.5.1, which does not have this defect.