Sun Jan 22 13:43:19 GMT 2012 zooko@zooko.com

  * docs: backdoors.rst: stop using embedded URIs and tweak title so that trac will render it correctly; reflow to fill-column 77; M-x whitespace-cleanup

diff --git a/docs/backdoors.rst b/docs/backdoors.rst
index 29afbad11eaea409b5b32fb769de8cedf0ca20de..4b9c2eddd072554da7a91fa9f878d5b71ca9c017 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/backdoors.rst
+++ b/docs/backdoors.rst
@@ -1,34 +1,41 @@
-======================
+=======================
 Statement on Backdoors
-======================
+=======================
 
 October 5, 2010
 
-The New York Times has recently reported that the current U.S. administration
-is proposing a bill that would apparently, if passed, require communication
-systems to facilitate government wiretapping and access to encrypted data:
+The New York Times has `recently reported`_ that the current
+U.S. administration is proposing a bill that would apparently, if passed,
+require communication systems to facilitate government wiretapping and access
+to encrypted data.
 
-`<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html>`_ (login required; username/password pairs
-available at `bugmenot <http://www.bugmenot.com/view/nytimes.com>`_).
+(login required; username/password pairs available at `bugmenot`_).
 
-Commentary by the
-`Electronic Frontier Foundation <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/government-seeks>`_,
-`Peter Suderman / Reason <http://reason.com/blog/2010/09/27/obama-administration-frustrate>`_,
-`Julian Sanchez / Cato Institute <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/designing-an-insecure-internet/>`_.
+.. _recently reported: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html
+.. _bugmenot: http://www.bugmenot.com/view/nytimes.com
+
+Commentary by the `Electronic Frontier Foundation`_, `Peter Suderman /
+Reason`_, `Julian Sanchez / Cato Institute`_.
+
+.. _Electronic Frontier Foundation: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/government-seeks
+.. _Peter Suderman / Reason: http://reason.com/blog/2010/09/27/obama-administration-frustrate
+.. _Julian Sanchez / Cato Institute: http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/designing-an-insecure-internet/
 
 The core Tahoe developers promise never to change Tahoe-LAFS to facilitate
 government access to data stored or transmitted by it. Even if it were
-desirable to facilitate such access—which it is not—we believe it would not be
-technically feasible to do so without severely compromising Tahoe-LAFS'
+desirable to facilitate such access—which it is not—we believe it would not
+be technically feasible to do so without severely compromising Tahoe-LAFS'
 security against other attackers. There have been many examples in which
 backdoors intended for use by government have introduced vulnerabilities
 exploitable by other parties (a notable example being the Greek cellphone
-eavesdropping scandal in 2004/5). RFCs `1984 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1984>`_
-and `2804 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804>`_ elaborate on the security case
-against such backdoors.
+eavesdropping scandal in 2004/5). RFCs `1984`_ and `2804`_ elaborate on the
+security case against such backdoors.
+
+.. _1984: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1984
+.. _2804: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804
 
-Note that since Tahoe-LAFS is open-source software, forks by people other than
-the current core developers are possible. In that event, we would try to
+Note that since Tahoe-LAFS is open-source software, forks by people other
+than the current core developers are possible. In that event, we would try to
 persuade any such forks to adopt a similar policy.
 
 The following Tahoe-LAFS developers agree with this statement: