docs: edit about.html, add P.S. about expansion of LAFS, add Andrew Orlowski to media...

diff --git a/docs/about.html b/docs/about.html
index de8834a503171072caa8ee1f432a1c20aa9c8614..d1ead0adc3d26a7505ac3b57538aeab10e760531 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/about.html
+++ b/docs/about.html
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@
     <h1>Welcome to Tahoe-LAFS</h1>
     <p>Welcome to Tahoe, the Least-Authority Filesystem.  Tahoe-LAFS is the only secure cloud storage system.  All of the source code is available under a choice of two Free Software, Open Source licences.</p>
     <h2>The only secure cloud storage system?</h2>
-    <p>Every seller of cloud storage services will tell you that their service is secure.  But what they mean by that is something fundamentally different from what we mean.  What they mean by "secure" is that they try really hard not to misuse the power to read or alter your data.  This turns out to be hard.  Bugs, misconfigurations, and operator error can accidentally expose your data to another customer or to the public, or can corrupt your data.  Criminals routinely gain illicit access to corporate servers.  Most insidiously of all, employees of the service provider itself may read or alter your data out of carelessness, avarice, or mere curiousity.  The most conscientious of these service providers spend considerable effort and expense trying to mitigate these threats.</p>
-    <p>What we mean by "security" is something different.  <em>The service provider never has the ability to read or alter your data in the first place.</em>  Never.  If you store your data with Tahoe-LAFS, then all of the threats above are non-issues to you.  Not only is it easy for the service provider to avoid exposing or corrupting your data, but in fact they couldn't do so if they tried.</p>
-    <p>Here's how it works.</p>
+    <p>Every seller of cloud storage services will tell you that their service is secure.  But what they mean by that is something fundamentally different from what we mean.  What they mean by "secure" is that they try really hard not to misuse the power to read or alter your data.  This turns out to be hard.  Bugs, misconfigurations, and operator error can accidentally expose your data to another customer or to the public, or can corrupt your data.  Criminals routinely gain illicit access to corporate servers.  Most insidiously of all, employees of the service provider itself may read or alter your data out of carelessness, avarice, or mere curiousity.  The most conscientious of these service providers spend considerable effort and expense trying to mitigate these risks.</p>
+    <p>What we mean by "security" is something different.  <em>The service provider never has the ability to read or alter your data in the first place.</em>  Never.  If you store your data with Tahoe-LAFS, then all of the threats described above are non-issues to you.  Not only is it easy for the service provider to avoid exposing or corrupting your data, but in fact they couldn't do so if they tried.</p>
+    <p>All that, and we don't sacrifice convenience or ease-of-use!  Here's how it works.</p>
 
     <img src="http://allmydata.org/~zooko/network-and-reliance-topology.png"></img>
 

diff --git a/docs/how_to_make_a_tahoe_release.txt b/docs/how_to_make_a_tahoe_release.txt
index cd4c94d01d26a9b105087e79ebbdf0ce12340f0a..0eedbf4e9e56e1b2f51151bb5e557cda8d4d1537 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/how_to_make_a_tahoe_release.txt
+++ b/docs/how_to_make_a_tahoe_release.txt
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 8 make sure buildbot is green
 9 make sure debs got built and uploaded properly
 10 make sure a sumo sdist tarball got built and uploaded properly
-11 send out relnotes.txt: tahoe-announce@lists.allmydata.org, tahoe-dev@lists.allmydata.org, p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com, lwn@lwn.net, cap-talk@mail.eros-os.org, cryptography@metzdown.com, twisted-python@twistedmatrix.com, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, duplicity-talk@nongnu.org, news@phoronix.com, python-list@python.org, cygwin@cygwin.com, linked in cloud storage group, The Boulder Linux Users' Group, cryptopp-users@googlegroups.com, the "decentralization" group on groups.yahoo.com
-12 update Wiki: x front page news, x news, old news, x parade of release notes
+11 send out relnotes.txt: tahoe-announce@lists.allmydata.org, tahoe-dev@lists.allmydata.org, p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com, lwn@lwn.net, cap-talk@mail.eros-os.org, cryptography@metzdown.com, twisted-python@twistedmatrix.com, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, duplicity-talk@nongnu.org, news@phoronix.com, python-list@python.org, cygwin@cygwin.com, linked in cloud storage group, The Boulder Linux Users' Group, cryptopp-users@googlegroups.com, the "decentralization" group on groups.yahoo.com, andrew.orlowski@theregister.co.uk
+12 update Wiki: front page news, news, old news, parade of release notes
 13 update hacktahoe.org
 14 update "current version" information and make an "announcement of new release" on freshmeat
 15 upload to pypi with "python ./setup.py sdist upload register"

diff --git a/relnotes.txt b/relnotes.txt
index fe5c6afdcb431f750418e9a3bddebe86f690ee9b..a5a9ce9852ad72c56dc8cb4ce1e604934d3293f1 100644 (file)
--- a/relnotes.txt
+++ b/relnotes.txt
@@ -131,6 +131,11 @@ besides.
 April 13, 2009
 Boulder, Colorado, USA
 
+P.S.  Just kidding about that acronym.  "LAFS" actually stands for
+"Lightweight Authorization File System".  Or possibly for
+"Least-Authority File System".  There is no truth to the rumour that it
+actually stands for "Long-lived Axe-tolerant File System".
+
 [1] http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2009-March/001461.html
 [2] http://allmydata.org/trac/tahoe/browser/relnotes.txt?rev=3620
 [3] http://allmydata.org/trac/tahoe/browser/NEWS?rev=3835