-==============
- Known Issues
-==============
+.. -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+============
+Known Issues
+============
Below is a list of known issues in recent releases of Tahoe-LAFS, and how to
manage them. The current version of this file can be found at
-`<http://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe-lafs/trunk/docs/known_issues.rst>`_.
+http://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe-lafs/trunk/docs/known_issues.rst .
If you've been using Tahoe-LAFS since v1.1 (released 2008-06-11) or if you're
just curious about what sort of mistakes we've made in the past, then you might
-want to read `the "historical known issues" document
-<historical/historical_known_issues.txt>`_.
+want to read `the "historical known issues" document`_.
+
+.. _the "historical known issues" document: historical/historical_known_issues.txt
+
Issues in Tahoe-LAFS v1.8.2, released 2011-01-30
* `Known issues in the FTP and SFTP frontends`_
* `Traffic analysis based on sizes of files/directories, storage indices, and timing`_
+----
+
Unauthorized deletion of an immutable file by its storage index
---------------------------------------------------------------
gaining the ability to inspect the local filesystem of an existing storage
server.
-how to manage it
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+*how to manage it*
Tahoe-LAFS version v1.8.3 or newer (except v1.9a1) no longer has this flaw;
if you upgrade a storage server to a fixed release then that server is no
connected to that storage server. These lists are stored in memory and are
reset to empty when the process is restarted.
-See ticket `#1528 <http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1528>`_ for
-technical details.
+See ticket `#1528`_ for technical details.
+
+.. _#1528: http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1528
+----
+
Potential unauthorized access by JavaScript in unrelated files
--------------------------------------------------------------
have the ability to modify the contents of those files or directories,
then that script could modify or delete those files or directories.
-how to manage it
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+*how to manage it*
For future versions of Tahoe-LAFS, we are considering ways to close off
this leakage of authority while preserving ease of use -- the discussion
-of this issue is ticket `#615 <http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/615>`_.
+of this issue is ticket `#615`_.
For the present, either do not view files stored in Tahoe-LAFS through a
web user interface, or turn off JavaScript in your web browser before
doing so, or limit your viewing to files which you know don't contain
malicious JavaScript.
+.. _#615: http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/615
+
+
+----
Potential disclosure of file through embedded hyperlinks or JavaScript in that file
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
browsers, so being careful which hyperlinks you click on is not
sufficient to prevent this from happening.
-how to manage it
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+*how to manage it*
For future versions of Tahoe-LAFS, we are considering ways to close off
this leakage of authority while preserving ease of use -- the discussion
-of this issue is ticket `#127 <http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/127>`_.
+of this issue is ticket `#127`_.
For the present, a good work-around is that if you want to store and
view a file on Tahoe-LAFS and you want that file to remain private, then
and remove any JavaScript unless you are sure that the JavaScript is not
written to maliciously leak access.
+.. _#127: http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/127
+
+
+----
Command-line arguments are leaked to other local users
------------------------------------------------------
arguments. This includes directory caps that you set up with the "tahoe
add-alias" command.
-how to manage it
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+*how to manage it*
As of Tahoe-LAFS v1.3.0 there is a "tahoe create-alias" command that does
the following technique for you.
access to your files and directories.
+----
+
Capabilities may be leaked to web browser phishing filter / "safe browsing" servers
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"safe browing" component, which is turned on by default, and which sends
any URLs that it deems suspicious to a central server.
-Microsoft gives a brief description of their filter's operation at
-`<http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2005/09/09/463204.aspx>`_. Firefox
-and Chrome both use Google's "safe browsing API" which is documented
-at `<http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/>`_ and
-`<http://code.google.com/p/google-safe-browsing/wiki/Protocolv2Spec>`_.
+Microsoft gives `a brief description of their filter's operation`_. Firefox
+and Chrome both use Google's `"safe browsing API"`_ (`specification`_).
This of course has implications for the privacy of general web browsing
(especially in the cases of Firefox and Chrome, which send your main
-personally identifying Google cookie along with these requests without
-your explicit consent, as described in `Firefox bugzilla ticket #368255
-<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=368255>`_).
+personally identifying Google cookie along with these requests without your
+explicit consent, as described in `Firefox bugzilla ticket #368255`_.
The reason for documenting this issue here, though, is that when using the
Tahoe-LAFS web user interface, it could also affect confidentiality and integrity
version of this file stated that Firefox had abandoned their phishing
filter; this was incorrect.
-how to manage it
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.. _a brief description of their filter's operation: http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2005/09/09/463204.aspx
+.. _"safe browsing API": http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/
+.. _specification: http://code.google.com/p/google-safe-browsing/wiki/Protocolv2Spec
+.. _Firefox bugzilla ticket #368255: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=368255
+
+
+*how to manage it*
If you use any phishing filter or "safe browsing" feature, consider either
disabling it, or not using the WUI via that browser. Phishing filters have
-very limited effectiveness (see
-`<http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/ndss-phish-tools-final.pdf>`_), and phishing
-or malware attackers have learnt how to bypass them.
+`very limited effectiveness`_ , and phishing or malware attackers have learnt
+how to bypass them.
+
+.. _very limited effectiveness: http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/ndss-phish-tools-final.pdf
To disable the filter in IE7 or IE8:
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- Click Close.
+----
+
Known issues in the FTP and SFTP frontends
------------------------------------------
-These are documented in `docs/frontends/FTP-and-SFTP.rst <frontends/FTP-and-SFTP.rst>`_
-and at `<http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/SftpFrontend>`_.
+These are documented in `docs/frontends/FTP-and-SFTP.rst`_ and on `the SftpFrontend page`_ on the wiki.
+
+.. _docs/frontends/FTP-and-SFTP.rst: frontends/FTP-and-SFTP.rst
+.. _the SftpFrontend page: http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/SftpFrontend
+
+----
Traffic analysis based on sizes of files/directories, storage indices, and timing
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
projects / tahoe-lafs / tahoe-lafs.git / commitdiff